The Public‑Private Partnerships (PPP) Committee delivered a significant blow to the proposed Usahihi Expressway, a KSh 468 billion (approximately USD 3.6 billion) Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) toll highway linking Nairobi to Mombasa. After months of technical review, the PPP Committee ruled that the Project Development Report (PDR), submitted by Everstrong Capital, a US‑based infrastructure investment firm, did not meet PPP Act standards and advised outright abandonment of the proposal in accordance with Section 43(11)(c) of the PPP Act, 2021.
Usahihi Expressway Overview And Vision
The Usahihi Expressway was envisioned as a transformative infrastructure project, a greenfield, four-lane dual carriageway stretching approximately 419 kilometres between Nairobi and Mombasa. Depending on different feasibility reports and route alignments, the actual distance was cited to range between 440 and 459 kilometres. Designed to significantly enhance transport efficiency, the expressway aimed to reduce the current journey time of over 10 hours to just around 4.5 hours, offering a faster, safer, and more predictable link between Kenya’s capital and its busiest port.
The project was structured under a 30-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) concession model as part of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) framework. Under this arrangement, a private consortium, led by Everstrong Capital Limited, a U.S.-based infrastructure investment firm, would take full responsibility for the financing, design, construction, operation, tolling, and maintenance of the expressway.
The consortium included strategic local partners such as CPF Capital & Advisory, and a broader investment coalition known as the “Pack Hunters Club.” This group brought together a mix of Kenyan pension funds, insurance firms, SACCOs, and Islamic financiers, signalling a strong commitment to local financial participation and ownership.
The overall cost of the expressway was projected at between USD 3.5 billion and USD 3.6 billion, translating to approximately KSh 452–468 billion. The financing model combined both international and domestic sources. An estimated USD 1.1 billion was expected to come from U.S. institutional lenders, including the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
A further USD 1 billion, or around KSh 129 billion, was to be raised through domestic institutional bonds or debt issued by the Pack Hunters Club. The remaining funding would be sourced from international commercial financiers, including institutions such as JP Morgan, Standard Bank, and others.
Progress on the project accelerated significantly in May 2024, when a Project Development Agreement (PDA) was signed during President William Ruto’s official visit to the United States. This agreement marked a major milestone, cementing both government and investor commitment to the expressway. Following that, on 5 May 2025, the consortium submitted its Project Development Report (PDR) to the Kenya National Highways Authority (KeNHA). The submission included a detailed, 2,300-page report covering all technical, legal, environmental, social, and financial aspects of the project.
At the time, financial close was being targeted by the end of 2025, with construction expected to commence in the first quarter of 2026. The build phase was anticipated to take between three to four years, placing full completion within reach by 2029, assuming all approvals and compliance milestones were met.
What Led to the PPP Committee Rejection
The turning point for the Usahihi Expressway project came on 2 July 2025, when the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) Committee issued a formal ruling on the Project Development Report (PDR) submitted by Everstrong Capital. After a comprehensive review, the Committee concluded that the PDR did not satisfy the mandatory feasibility standards outlined under Section 43(11)(c) of the PPP Act, 2021.
As a result, they recommended that the development proposal be abandoned in its current form. However, the ruling did not entirely close the door on the project. In line with Section 43(12) of the same Act, the Committee made it clear that the proposal could be resubmitted, but only after all deficiencies were properly addressed and full compliance with statutory criteria was achieved.
Although the Committee did not release a detailed public report listing the specific shortcomings, sources familiar with the review process indicate that several critical issues were identified. These included concerns about the project’s technical feasibility, weaknesses in the proposed risk-sharing framework, and inadequacies in financial modelling. Questions were also raised around the project’s affordability for the public sector, whether it would deliver value for money, and the level of compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, the report highlighted insufficient stakeholder engagement, which is a key requirement for PPP approval in Kenya.
Procedurally, the Usahihi expressway had already cleared its first hurdle in December 2023, when it was given approval to advance to the Project Development Report stage. However, with the Committee’s recent rejection, the statutory process now stipulates that the proposal can only proceed if it is resubmitted with full alignment to the PPP Act requirements. Until then, the project remains on hold.
Expected Benefits Of Usahihi Expressway
Had the Usahihi Expressway moved forward as planned, Kenya stood to gain a wide range of transformative benefits—both economic and social—positioning the country at the forefront of modern infrastructure development in the region.
One of the most immediate and tangible advantages would have been the drastic reduction in travel time between Nairobi and Mombasa. The current highway journey often stretches beyond ten hours, especially for cargo and long-distance travelers, due to congestion, poor road conditions, and unpredictable delays. The expressway, with its four-lane dual carriageway design, was expected to cut that time to just about 4.5 hours. Such a significant time saving wouldn’t just offer convenience—it would dramatically improve road safety, reducing fatigue-related accidents and lowering exposure to high-risk stretches of one of Africa’s most dangerous highways.
Beyond convenience, the project had the potential to unlock Kenya’s full role as a regional trade powerhouse by creating a more efficient economic corridor. By easing the movement of goods between the Port of Mombasa and inland destinations, the expressway would reduce logistics costs and accelerate delivery timelines for businesses. This would enhance Kenya’s competitiveness as the anchor economy along the Northern Corridor and position the country as a reliable trade gateway for East and Central Africa.
The construction and eventual operation of the expressway also promised significant employment opportunities. Tens of thousands of jobs were projected to be created, directly and indirectly, across various sectors, ranging from construction and engineering to logistics, roadside services, and infrastructure maintenance.
Importantly, the project was designed with an inclusive Local Content Plan, which aimed to prioritize youth, women, and people with disabilities, while also integrating vocational training through Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions. This would have ensured not only job creation, but also skills development and long-term employability for thousands of Kenyans.
From a financing standpoint, the Usahihi Expressway stood out as a bold step toward innovative, locally anchored project funding. A significant portion of the financing was expected to come from a domestic debt tranche spearheaded by CPF Financial Services and a consortium of local pension funds, insurers, and cooperative societies, collectively known as the Pack Hunters Club.
This model represented one of the largest infrastructure bond initiatives in Africa and was seen as a milestone in deepening Kenya’s capital markets and mobilizing long-term domestic capital for development.
Environmental sustainability was also a core component of the expressway’s blueprint. The proposed design included forward-thinking features such as dedicated wildlife overpasses and underpasses to minimize disruption to animal migration routes, as well as the integration of electric vehicle (EV) charging stations powered by renewable energy. Biodiversity-sensitive routing, eco-friendly rest stops, and low-carbon construction practices were intended to align the project with Kenya’s climate goals and environmental obligations.
Crucially, the project was structured to proceed without adding any burden to the Kenyan taxpayer. The financing model followed a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) approach, where the private consortium would fully fund the construction, maintenance, and operation of the expressway, recouping its investment over a 30-year period through toll collection. This meant the government would not need to issue sovereign guarantees or raise public debt, an important consideration given current fiscal constraints.
In sum, the Usahihi Expressway held the promise of revolutionising Kenya’s transport infrastructure, catalyzing inclusive economic growth, and setting a new standard for how large-scale projects can be financed and delivered responsibly.
Impacts & Fallout from the Rejection Of Usahihi Expressway
- Delay in infrastructure delivery
The PPP Committee’s recommendation introduces at least several months, or more, of delay before a viable, compliant PDR is resubmitted and re‑approved. This stalls the planned 2026 construction start, pushing back expected economic benefits and connectivity improvements.
- Investor confidence at risk
Everstrong Capital and its global and local co‑financiers have dedicated time and resources to preparation. A rejection may erode confidence among institutional investors, including US Exim, DFC, JP Morgan, and local pension funds, unless trust can be rebuilt through resubmission and transparent technical improvement.
- Financial cost escalation & exposure
Delays often lead to cost overruns, due to inflation, currency volatility, land acquisition delays, contractor mobilisation costs, and financing fees. If the project is relaunched later, the original KSh 468 billion cap may no longer suffice.
- Reputational risk & public perception
Criticism may arise over the project’s governance, design, or cost. Public debates about toll pricing, equity (e.g. compelling heavy trucks to use only the toll route), and control of routes may intensify, as seen in social‑media commentary lamenting toll dominance over existing free highways.
- Policy implications for PPP pipeline
This ruling underscores the PPP Committee’s insistence on strict compliance with the PPP Act, setting a precedent for future large-scale projects. Other proposals may now face sharper scrutiny, requiring higher diligence in preparation.
How the Government Can Still Unlock the Usahihi Expressway Potential
To unlock the full potential of the Usahihi Expressway despite the recent setback, the government, in collaboration with Everstrong Capital and other key stakeholders, must take a number of strategic actions to correct course and ensure the project’s long-term success.
First, the developers should be encouraged and supported in resubmitting a revised Project Development Report (PDR) that comprehensively addresses the concerns raised by the PPP Committee. This means making substantial improvements across a range of areas, including financial modelling, particularly in relation to affordability and sensitivity analysis, risk distribution between public and private players, legal structuring, procurement clarity, and the credibility of traffic forecasts.
Moreover, the revised proposal must demonstrate integrity and thoroughness in how it engages key stakeholders. It is crucial that the PPP Directorate and the National Treasury play a guiding role here by clearly outlining the deficiencies that need correction and offering a framework to ensure compliance with the PPP Act.
Equally important is the need to strengthen stakeholder engagement and transparency throughout the process. All affected parties, especially county governments and local communities along the corridor, should be given genuine opportunities to participate in consultations. Environmental approvals must be robust and well-documented, and any local content plans, especially those related to employment and enterprise opportunities for Kenyan citizens, should be made public and subject to review.
Transparency around the tolling structure, the availability of alternative non-toll routes, and mechanisms for compensating displaced or affected communities will go a long way toward building public trust and securing broader social buy-in.
A third priority involves reviewing and refining tolling policies to ensure fairness and affordability. Public concerns, especially those voiced online and by logistics operators, highlight a fear that the expressway may unfairly force heavy transporters to use toll roads while exposing them to fluctuating costs tied to foreign currency.
To address this, the government should consider negotiating clear pricing caps, potentially within the range of KSh 12 to 13 per kilometre, while also incorporating safeguards against inflation-linked toll hikes. Additionally, access to a well-maintained, toll-free alternative route must be guaranteed for those who either cannot afford or choose not to use the expressway.
In tandem with these measures, the government must ensure that regulatory oversight is strengthened and that a robust value-for-money analysis is embedded in the project’s review process. Independent assessments, possibly involving international development partners or infrastructure-focused NGOs, should be deployed to verify that the project’s economic returns, user-fee structures, and concession arrangements ultimately benefit the country. This will help guard against overpricing, inefficiencies, and lopsided risk allocations that could disadvantage the public sector.
Parallel to these strategic corrections, the government should also move forward with critical enabling steps that will shorten the time from approval to construction once the PDR is accepted. These include progressing land acquisition negotiations, advancing environmental and social impact assessments, fast-tracking skills development through TVET institutions, and preparing procurement processes for contractors and suppliers. Legal and institutional readiness must also be addressed so that no regulatory bottlenecks stand in the way of financial closure and construction mobilisation.
Lastly, the role of domestic financial institutions in the project should be clearly visible and meaningful. The proposed involvement of local investors through the “Pack Hunters Club”, a consortium of pension funds, insurance companies, SACCOs, and Islamic financiers, should not just be symbolic.
Their participation should be actively structured to encourage a strong sense of national ownership. By showcasing the involvement of Kenyan pension funds and financial institutions in funding this major infrastructure, the government can build local credibility and reinforce the development of domestic capital markets.
The PPP Committee’s 2 July 2025 rejection of the Usahihi Expressway’s PDR, on the basis that it failed to meet key statutory criteria, is a major setback to what had been one of Africa’s most ambitious private‑sector highway proposals. Yet the moral holds: infrastructure ambition must be matched with technical excellence, transparency, and compliance. Without compromising on due diligence, Kenya still has an opportunity to relaunch the project in improved form.
If fixed, the Usahihi Expressway could transform the Nairobi–Mombasa corridor: reducing travel from more than 10 hours to under 5, enhancing regional trade, creating tens of thousands of jobs, protecting biodiversity, empowering institutions to finance big infrastructure, and avoiding burdening taxpayers with debt.
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